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Abstract
In models of monopolistic competition with a single factor of production,
imposition of tariff can lead (paradoxically) to a drop in the aggregate price
index of the import competing sector. The present model first introduces an
internationally mobile capital in such a set up. It is found that tariff at-
tracts a capital inflow into the protected sector, which results in a reduction
the price index. Interestingly, the tariff protected importing sector expands,
although the domestic price index falls. However if there is a homogeneous
non-traded good, along with the mobile capital, effect on the price index of
the import competing sector becomes ambiguous. Further, the number of
varieties produced by the import competing sector can actually fall and the
import competing sector may actually contract.
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1. Introduction
Traditional trade theory has an extensive literature that deals with the
effects of imposition of tariffs. In general, imposition of tariff has two ef-
fects, firstly, it enhances welfare by improving the terms of trade for the
tariff imposing country, and secondly, it reduces welfare by causing the im-
port competing sector to expand(and thus crowd out cheaper importables).
Competitive trade theory identifies a situation where imposition of tariff
can lower domestic price of the imports (that is when the first effect domi-
nates the second effect). Better known as the Metzler Paradox (see Metzler
(1949)), this can happen when the improvement in terms of trade, for the
tariff imposing nation is so high that it actually lowers the domestic price of
the output of the import competing sector and thus fail to protect it. Neary
(1995) develops a model where capital is used as a specific factor in one of
the industries, but is sluggishly mobile across countries. Imposition of tar-
iff, in the short run(that is when capital stocks of the two countries do not
respond to price changes), may under certain conditions lead to a Metzler
Paradox type effect. A somewhat similar result is shown by Marjit(1993).
It is shown that in a production structure exhibiting both Heckscher-Ohlin
and specific factor features (this production structure is similar to that of
Gruen-Corden (1970)), uniform tariffs may fail to protect some of the im-
port competing sectors. This price lowering effect of the tariffs is due to the
resource allocation between the Heckscher-Ohlin and specific factor produc-
tion structures. Choi and Yu (1987) incorporates variable returns to scale 2
in a two country, two commodity and two factor general equilibrium model
and establishes sufficient conditions, for which tariffs may fail to protect the
domestic import competing sector.
All these models are based on the assumptions of perfect competition
and/or constant returns to scale. Departing from this tradition, trade in
differentiated products has been modelled in the literature of international
trade theory by a fairly extensive number of contributors 3. Helpman and
Krugman (1985) argues that increasing returns to scale and transportation
costs would mean, the industry would tend to concentrate in a single coun-
2 The scale economies in this model are external to the firm and internal to the industry.
3Krugman(1979,1980,1981), Ethier(1982), Helpman (1981) and Venables (1982,1987),
builds models of intra industry trade where markets are monopolistically competitive ,
and trade in differentiated products occur due to scale economies and love for variety
exhibited by the agents (See Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)).
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try where most of its output is consumed so as to take advantage of the
scale economies and also to reduce transportation costs. This has become
famous in the literature of international trade as the home market effect.
Helpman and Krugman (1989) build up a variant of the model that is de-
veloped by Venables (1987) and associates home market effects with price
lowering effect of tariffs. They consider a two country world in which there is
both a differentiated goods sector and a homogeneous good, produced by a
constant returns to scale technology and increasing returns to scale technol-
ogy respectively by a single factor of production namely labour. While the
homogeneous good can be traded in a costless manner, there is presence of
transportation costs for trading the differentiated goods. In this setting, the
home country is assumed to impose an ad valorem tariff unilaterally on the
differentiated goods sector. Since the relatively cheaper varieties produced
in home rises, this tends to reduce the aggregate price index. On the other
hand, imposition of tariff on the foreign varieties makes them dearer and
tends to raise the aggregate price index. The first effect dominates and thus
imposition of tariff actually lowers the price index faced by home consumers.
The strength of the result lies in the fact that such a price reducing effect
of the tariffs does not remain a mere theoretical curiosum and would not
require very restrictive conditions to hold.
The present model builds closely on Helpman and Krugman(1989), by
introducing a mobile factor(capital) and a non-traded homogeneous good.
Two distinct but related issues are addressed in the process. Firstly, the
assumption of a traded homogeneous good is retained but only the single
factor assumption of Venables(1987) and Helpman and Krugman (1989) is
changed. Thus, it discusses the implications of capital mobility in presence
of tariffs. Capital is used to start production of the varieties. All goods
are traded and capital is fully mobile across nations4. This in turn ensures
complete factor price equalization between the home country and the for-
eign country. Even in such a situation home market effects takes place and
the aggregate price index falls. Imposition of tariff by the home country
increases the number of varieties produced in Home and this gets mani-
fested as a lower price index in the home economy. Thus, capital inflow
is caused due to imposition of tariff, (reflected by a rise in the number of
home varieties) which in turn improves welfare. This is accompanied by an
4Thus capital is ”footloose” as in Martin and Rogers (1995).
3
increase in the rent earned by capital, which also improves the welfare by
enhancing the national income. The only potential source of welfare loss
can be the reduction in tariff revenue (due to reduction in the foreign im-
ported varieties). Welfare consequences of factor mobility has been discussed
extensively in the literature of international economics. Kemp(1962,1966)
and Jones(1967) discusses the implications of factor mobility in presence of
taxes and tariffs. In Johnson(1967) it is shown that factor accumulation may
lead to welfare immiserisation in presence of distortionary tariffs. Brecher
and Diaz Alejandro (1977) shows that capital inflow into a tariff protected
import competing sector, reduces the welfare of the economy unambigu-
ously by crowding out cheaper imports. Other contributions have been by
Tan(1969), Bertrand and Flatters(1971), Khan (1981) and Grinols (1991).
Sen et al (1997) discusses the issue of factor mobility in a set-up character-
ized by monopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale. Capital
inflow into the differentiated sector increases the number of varieties and
becomes a potential source of welfare gain. Chakraborty (2000)and Biswas
(2013) shows that capital inflow into a tariff protected import competing
sector, may lead to an increase in the import volume of the economy. In the
present model, capital inflow raises the number of home produced varieties
which leads to an improvement in welfare. This is because consumers now
pays transportation costs for a lesser number of varieties (as in Helpman
and Krugman (1989). However, imported brands fall, as a larger number of
firms relocate their production in the Home country.
In the next section, it is assumed that the homogeneous good is non traded,
while retaining the assumption of a mobile capital. The non traded good
is produced using only labour and a constant returns to scale technology,
while the differentiated good requires fixed units of capital to start the pro-
duction (this accounts for the fixed costs) production of each additional unit
of output requires only labour. Since the non traded good is both produced
and consumed within each country, hence there is no channel through which
the wage rates are equalized. Capital is allowed to be fully mobile and this
equalizes the rental (the return to capital) across countries (See Kind et al
(2000)). Trade in differentiated good is subject to transportation costs. In
such a set up imposition of unilateral tariff by the home country may not
lead to a drop in the price index via the home market effect. In general
the effect of the tariff on the wage rate, the number of varieties produced
and the price index for the differentiated good becomes ambiguous. This is
because in Helpman and Krugman (1989), when the home country imposes
tariff, only thing that adjusts to maintain the equilibrium is the number
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of varieties produced in each country. However in the present model, the
channels through which the adjustment takes place is not only the number
of varieties but also the wage rate (which in turn implies that the rental
and the per firm output adjusts). Imposition of tariff by the home country,
cetiris paribus, increases the tariff revenue. Increase in this tariff revenue
positively affects the consumer income (as we assume that the entire tariff
revenue is rebated back to the consumers) whose demand for the non traded
good rises pushing up its price in the home country. This in turn causes
the wage rate to rise in the economy relative to the foreign wage rate. The
difference lies in the assumption of the non traded good. Since labour is
the only factor of production that is used in the production of non traded
good , wage rate is free to adjust. Interestingly, no unambiguous effect can
be predicted for the number of varieties produced by the import competing
sector. This is important from the view point of trade policy. Imposition of
tariff may actually fail to protect the import competing sector not only in
terms of price (since the aggregate price index may fall) but also in terms of
the varieties produced. Moreover, a particular parametrization is obtained
for which wage rate of the economy actually falls.
This model is also closely related to Davis (1998). Davis (1998) introduces
uniform transportation costs in an identical Helpman and Krugman (1985)
model to arrive at the conclusion that manufacturing is spread across coun-
tries in proportion to their labour size when the homogeneous good is non
traded in the equilibrium. The present model follows Davis (1998) in as-
suming the existence of trading costs in the homogeneous good, in fact it is
assumed that these costs are prohibitive in nature. However, unlike Davis
(1998), the present model extends the analysis to two factors of production
(one of them being mobile internationally), and focusses on the price de-
pressing effects of tariffs. Thus , this paper can be considered to link the
price depressing effects of tariffs with models where the homogeneous good
is subject to transportation costs.5
Section-II discusses the first model with mobile capital. Section-III then
5Head, Mayer and Ries(2002),and Crozet and Trionfetti (2007), discusses home market
effects in the context of global agglomeration of the differentiated goods sector vis-a-vis the
labour allocation across countries.The present model, is related to these papers as tariffs
are used to relocate production, and thus depress the price index of the differentiated
goods. Presence of a non traded good does however generates income effects that may
prevent the price index to fall.
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proceeds by introducing the non traded good in this set up. Finally Section
IV concludes and discusses the implications for policy.
2. Basic model with mobile capital
We consider an (Home) economy where agents have a utility function
given by
U = logD + C (1)
where the good C is homogeneous good and the good D is a composite good
which compromises of varieties produced both by Home and Foreign. These
varieties are denoted by nh and nf respectively.
D = (
nh∑
1
Dρh +
nf∑
1
Dρf )
1
ρ (2)
The D good is modelled as in Dixit-Stiglitz (1977). D can be alternatively
interpreted as a final good which is produced by intermediaries nh and nf
that are produced in the home and foreign economies respectively (see Ethier
(1982)). Since all agents are identical one can consider equation(1)and equa-
tion (2) indicating aggregate variables. Maximizing equation (1) subject to
the budget constraint Y = PCC + PDD yields
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D =
PC
PD
(3)
C =
Y
PC
− 1 (4)
where PC , PD and Y represents the price of goods C, price of good D
and the national income at home respectively.All goods are traded.
The good C is produced using only labour while the sector D requires
both capital and labour for production. One unit of capital is required to
set up production and production of each additional unit of output requires
one unit of labour.
This homogeneous good sector is assumed to be competitive and requires
one unit of labour for production of each unit of output. Thus zero-profit
condition of this sector , can be written as
PC = w (5)
6Assuming an interior solution both D,C > 0
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where w is the wage earned by the labourers. We choose the varieties
produced in the home as the numeraire and thus price of each domestic
brand, ph is normalized to unity. As evident from (2) the D sector is mo-
nopolistically competitive and profit maximization by each producer implies,
ph(1− 1
σ
) = w (6)
where σ = 11−ρ is the elasticity of substitution among the varieties.
Equation (5)and equation (6) implies that
PC = w = ρ (7)
To understand the home market effects (i.e. the effect of tariff on the
price index of the differentiated goods industry) it is assumed that Home
imposes a tariff on the foreign varieties.On the other hand the good C can
be traded costlessly across the world. Trade in the differentiated products
is subject to transportation cost. Specifically, if one unit of good is shipped
from a country, then only 1τ units of the good reaches its destination, where
τ > 1 (See Kind et al (2000)). The foreign country is identical to the home,
except the fact that it does not impose any tariffs on the varieties produced
in the home good. (All variables of the foreign country are represented
by asterisk.). Price of the composite good in the home and foreign are
respectively given as
P 1−σD = nhp
1−σ
h + nf (τpf (1 + t))
1−σ = nh + nf (τpf (1 + t))1−σ (8)
P ∗
1−σ
D = nh(τph)
1−σ + nfp1−σf = nh(τ)
1−σ + nfp1−σf (9)
pf represents the prices of the foreign brands and t is the tariff rate
imposed by the home country on the varieties of the foreign country.
Uninhibited trade equalizes the price of good C in both countries. Thus,
Pc = w = ρ = P
∗
C = w
∗ (10)
However,the composite price indexes for the differentiated goods does not
get equalized ( see equation (8) and equation (9) ) even in vicinity of free
trade because of presance of transportation cost. Equation (10) also implies
pf = ph = 1 (11)
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xh and xf are the outputs produced by the home and foreign firm while
r is the rental rate of capital.Free-entry in the differentiated goods sector
implies that firms would break even and earn no supernormal profits.Thus
xh = xf = σr (12)
Full mobility of capital across countries guarantees that the rental is equal
both in home and foreign.
Market clearing for a typical domestic firm would imply that (See Krugman
(1979) for the derivation of the demand functions) 7
xh = Dh + τD
∗
h =
p−σh
P 1−σD
ρ+ τ(τph)
−σ ρ
P ∗1−σD
Similarly for the foreign firm
xf =
τ1−σ
P 1−σD
[1 + t]−σp−σf ρ+
p−σf ρ
P ∗1−σD
Using equation (11) and equating the per firm output of the home and
foreign country, as stated in equation(12), the ratio of price indices for the
differentiated goods sector can be expressed in terms of tariff and trans-
portation cost.
(
PD
P ∗D
)σ−1 =
1− τ1−σ
1− τ1−σ[1 + t]−σ (13)
The above relation can be used to solve for the number of varieties
produced in each country. (It is to be noted that the number of varieties
produced in each country are not independent variables.) It is assumed
that KH and KF are the capital stocks owned by the Home and Foreign
economies respectively . Thus,
nh + nf = K
H +KF (14)
Solving equations (8), (9), (13), (14) we obtain the number of varieties
produced in each country (See Appendix A for derivation),
nh =
(KH +KF )[{τ(1 + t)}1−σ −B]
τ1−σB − (B + 1) + [τ(1 + t)]1−σ , whereB =
1− τ1−σ[1 + t]−σ
1− τ1−σ (15)
7Substituting equation(7) into equation(3)we find that total expenditure on home
goods is simply ρ
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nf =
(KH +KF )[τ(1 + t)1−σB − 1]
τ1−σB − (B + 1) + [τ(1 + t)]1−σ
The two countries are completely symmetric when there is free trade. This
becomes clear, from equation (15) as it implies that in the vicinity of free
trade nh = nf = (K
H + KF )12 . As in Venables (1987), it is interesting to
find out the effect of tariff on the aggregate price index of the differentiated
good. The difference between that model and the present model is that
unlike Venables (1987 ) the per firm output is not constant. To understand
the effect on the price index, the effect of tariff on the number of varieties
produced in Home is analysed. Differentiating equation (15) with respect to
t, at the vicinity of free trade,(t = 0) (See Appendix-A)
dnh
dt
=
(KH +KF )
4(1− τ1−σ) [τ
1−σ(σ − 1) + στ
1−σ(1 + τ1−σ)
1− τ1−σ ] (16)
which in turn implies that
nˆh =
dt
2(1− τ1−σ) [τ
1−σ(σ − 1) + στ
1−σ(1 + τ1−σ)
(1− τ1−σ) ] (17)
(since at the vicinity of free trade, nh = (K
H +KF )/2 )
Equation (17) clearly indicates that number of varieties produced by the
home country rises unambiguously. Since capital is required to begin pro-
duction of each variety, a higher number of home produced varieties would
mean that a larger share of the global capital stock is now employed in
the Home country. This is fairly intuitive, as the domestic sector receives
protection, imported brands are crowded out of the economy, and thus do-
mestic sector expands. Interestingly, unlike what happens in Brecher and
Diaz Alejandro(1977) model, an inflow of capital into the protected sector
increases the number of brands for which the domestic residents do not have
to pay transportation costs (an increase in home produced varieties). Cap-
ital inflow, does conditionally increase welfare in Sen et all(1997)through
increasing the available number of varieties in the home economy. In the
present model, imposition of tariff actually makes it profitable for firms to
relocate their production in Home rather than in the foreign country. This
in turn reduces the aggregate price index faced by the consumers. The only
factor that can raise the price index is the relatively higher price of the
tariff ridden imports. To determine the magnitude of theses changes, we
differentiate (8) in the vicinity of free trade. ( See Appendix-A)
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PˆD(σ − 1)
dt
=
−τ1−σ − σ − (σ − 1)τ2(1−σ)
2(1 + τ1−σ)(1− τ1−σ) < 0 (18)
The RHS of equation (18) is negative. Thus home market effects lowers
the aggregate price index faced by domestic consumers in this model. This,
in turn brings unambiguous gain in terms of welfare. Hence tariffs , make
the Home country attractive to mobile capital and though it reduces the
number of import competing foreign brands, consumers are finally better
off in terms of the differentiated good. As in Sen(1998), Chakraborty (2000)
and Biswas (2013) an inflow of foreign capital has an ambiguous effect on
the overall welfare of the economy. It is shown in the Appendix-A, that
imposition of tariff increases the per firm output, the overall rental rate, and
the total volume of the import competing sector (nhxh). Its effect on the
tariff revenue is however ambiguous, since an imposition of tariff increases
the revenue reciepts directly, while reducing the demand for the imports
(and therby reducing the tariff revenue). The overall impact on the welfare
thus remain indeterminant. Interestingly, though there is a Metzler paradox
type effect, the total volume of the import competing sector (nhxh) rises.
3. Home market effects and non traded goods
Consider a variant of the above model. The only point of departure
being that now the good C is assumed to be a non-traded good. Davis
(1998) argues that when the homogeneous good is subject to trade costs,
market size does not play a decisive role in the global distribution of the
manufacturing sector. In the present analysis also home market effects get
weakened when the homogeneous good sector is non traded (to keep matters
simple, these trade costs are assumed to be prohibitive). More importantly,
this has implications for Metzler Paradox type effects found in Helpman
and Krugman(1989) and in the mobile capital model discussed above. We
assume (as in the previous section) that agents have a quasilinear utility
given by
U = logD + C (19)
where the good C is homogeneous good produced using only labour and
the good D is a composite good which compromises of varieties produced
both by Home and Foreign. Capital and labour both are employed in its
production. C is assumed to be non traded.
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D = (
nh∑
1
Dρh +
nf∑
1
Dρf )
1
ρ (20)
Since C is a non-traded good , equalization of wages in the two countries
is no longer guaranteed. Thus in the Home and Foreign we have respectively
PC = w = ρ (21)
P ∗C = w
∗ (22)
The second equality in equation (21)follows from assuming an identical
production structure of the traded sector D as in the previous model. That
is to start production of each variety one unit of capital is required, while
after that each additional unit of output is produced by employing one unit
of labour. Unlike equation (10), however, foreign wages are not equal to
the wage rate in the home market. This in turn would imply that prices of
domestic and foreign brands would not converge. Prices of home brands are
normalized to unity. Prices of foreign brands are a constant markup over
the foreign wages.
pf =
w∗
ρ
(23)
Moreover the per firm output of the home and foreign firms will be
different
xh =
r
1− ρ (24)
xf =
rρ
w∗(1− ρ) (25)
Now market clearing of the non traded good in Home implies that the
total supply of output produced must be equal to the demand of good C as
in equation (4)
L¯− nhxh = Y
PC
− 1
Using equation (21) and (24) we can write this
L¯− nh r
1− ρ =
ρL¯+ rKH + T
ρ
− 1
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KH is the capital of Home country, while L¯ is the labour force .It is assumed
that the home country imposes a tariff on the imports of the foreign varieties,
T is the tariff revenue generated by the imports and T = tnfτpfDf . Solving
for r we get
r =
ρ− T
nh
ρ
1−ρ +K
H
(26)
Similarly for the foreign country we have
r =
w∗
nf
ρ
1−ρ +K
F
(27)
where KF is the foreign capital stock. Free mobility of capital ensures that
rental rate of capital are equalised along nations. Thus equations (26) and
(27) relates that foreign wage rate with varieties produced in Home.
w∗ =
(ρ− T )(nf ρ1−ρ +KF )
(nh
ρ
1−ρ +K
H)
(28)
Capital market clearing across the world implies that
nh + nf = K
H +KF (29)
Differentiating equation (29) yields
δhnˆh + (1− δh)nˆf = 0 (30)
where δh = nh/2K , is the relative number of home varieties with respect
to total number of varieties produced in the world.
To understand the effect of tariffs on the varieties on the varieties pro-
duced in the home market , total differentiation of equation -(28)and using
equation(30) gives.
wˆ∗ =
−T
ρ− T Tˆ + {
−nhρσ
nfρσ +KF
+
nf (
−δh
1−δh )ρσ
nhρσ +KH
}nˆh
=
−T
ρ− T Tˆ − [
(KH +KF )(ρσ + 1)nhρσ
(nfρσ +KH)(nhρσ +KH)
]
= −B1tˆ+ { B1sh
1− δh −
(KH +KF )(ρσ + 1)nhρσ
(nfρσ +KF )(nhρσ +KH)
}nˆh +B1sh(σ − 1)wˆ∗
+
B1dt
1 + t
(σ + sf (1− σ))
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This on rearranging terms and after some manipulations yields
wˆ∗{1−B1(σ − 1)sh} − { B1sh
1− δh −
(KH +KF )(ρσ + 1)nhρσ
(nfρσ +KF )(nhρσ +KH)
}nˆh
= − B1tˆ
1 + t
[1 + t(1− σ) + sf t(σ − 1)] (31)
where B1 =
−T
αρ−T
Imposition of the tariff by the home country increases the tariff revenue
that accrues to the nation. Given the number of varieties ( nˆh = 0), an
increase in the tariff revenue gets translated into a higher national income
,since the entire tariff income is rebated to the consumers. The increased
income raises the price of the non traded good and in turn the wages of the
home labourers relative to the foreign workers. This is reflected in equation
(31) where keeping the number of varieties constant, an imposition of tariff
lowers the foreign wage. Our choice of numeraire implies this can be inter-
preted as a decline in the relative wage of foreign workers vis-a-vis the wage
rate of home workers
Equation(31) involving two variables the change in wage rate of the for-
eign country and the change in the varieties produced in the home economy.
To solve them explicitly we would require another equation involving these
two terms. This is obtained from the zero profit condition involving the
home firm and foreign firm. Free entry implies that in equilibrium, these
firms would just break even. Consider the case of the home firm
phxh
σ
− r = Dh + τD
∗
h
σ
− r = 0
the second equality follows from the market clearing condition for the out-
put produced by the home firm. Substituting the demand functions (See
Krugman(1979) ) we get the following equations for the home and foreign
firm respectively.
ρP σ−1d + τ
1−σw∗P ∗
σ−1
d = σr (32)
τ1−σw∗
1−σ
P σ−1d ρ
σ(1 + t)−σ + w∗
2−σ
ρσ−1P ∗
σ−1
d = σr (33)
These two equations yields
(
Pd
P ∗d
)σ−1 =
w∗2−σρσ−1 − τ1−σw∗
ρ− τ1−σw∗1−σρσ(1 + t)−σ (34)
13
Differentiating equation(34) and some algebraic manipulations yields
wˆ∗{(σ − 1)(s∗h − sh) + (σ − 2) + (σ − 1)(µ1 + µ2)}+ nˆh(
s∗h − sh
1− δh )
= −[µ2σ + sf (σ − 1) dt
1 + t
] (35)
sh =
nhphDh
Y and sf =
nfpfDf
Y are the total expenditure shares of home
and foreign varieties made by residents in the home economy. s∗h and s
∗
f are
the analogous counterparts for the foreign economy.
µ1 =
τ1−σw∗
w∗2−σρσ−1−w∗τ1−σ and µ2 =
τ1−σw∗
1−σ
ρσ(1+t)−σ
ρ−τ1−σw∗1−σρσ(1+t)−σ These equations
leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The effect of imposition of tariff by the home country can
either increase or decrease the foreign wage.Moreover the number of varieties
produced in home may either increase or fall.
Proof. Solving equations (34) and (35) around zero tariffs i.e. by assuming
that t = 0 we obtain
wˆ∗ =
−A(µ2σ + sf (σ − 1)) + ( s
∗
h−sh
1−δh )
nf τpfDf
αρ
ϑ
dt (36)
nˆh =
−[(σ − 1)(s∗h − sh) + (σ − 2)(µ1 + µ2)]nf τpfDfαρ + (µ2σ + sf (σ − 1))
ϑ
dt
(37)
The above two equations shows the effects of imposing tariff on the for-
eign wage rate and number of varieties produced in the home market. As
shown in the appendix-B, stability analysis implies that the denominator of
the above expressions is positive. However in general the sign of the nu-
merator in either case cannot be determined. In contrast to the model of
section-1, no unambiguous result is seen. More specifically unlike Venables
(1987) varieties produced by the home may actually fall.
We concentrate on a specific situation, where around free trade, the two
countries are identical (i.e. they are endowed with equal amount of capital
and labour ).The following proposition discusses the equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If both home and foreign have an equal endowment of capi-
tal and labour then imposition of tariff by the home leads to an unambiguous
fall in the wages of the foreign country, while the effect on home produced
number of varieties remains ambiguous
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Proof. Consider equation (34), substituting the value of the price indices
we can solve for nh in terms of the foreign wage rate at the vicinity of free
trade (t = 0)and assuming that KH = KF = K
nh =
2K[Gτ1−σw∗1−σρσ−1 − w∗1−σρσ−1]
τ1−σ − w∗1−σρσ−1 +Gτ1−σw∗1−σρσ−1 −G (38)
where G is the RHS of equation (34).Substituting w∗ = ρ, in equation(38)
and nh = K , in equation(28)we can focus on a particular equilibrium situ-
ation which is completely symmetric around free trade, where nh = nf = K
,and w∗ = ρ. It is to be noted that in Appendix -B we have assumed that
as firms enter into the market profits fall while as they exit, per firm profits
rise. Thus there is only one possible equilibrium consistent with zero profits
. Hence this is an unique equilibrium .
It is relatively straightforward, to check that s∗h = τ
1−σ/(1 + τ1−σ) < sh =
1/(1 + τ1−σ) In this situation, wage rate in the foreign economy falls (see
equation ( 36)), while the number of varieties produced in home can either
increase or decrease.
Proposition 3. Imposition of tariff by the home country has an ambiguous
effect on the price index .Interestingly total volume of output produced by the
import competing sector may actually contract
Proof. The price index of the differentiated goods sector is given by
equation(ref 8).Thus one can express the change in the aggregate price index
in terms of change in number of varieties produced in home and the change
in the foreign wage rate.
(1− σ)PˆD = shnˆh + (1− sh)(nˆf + (1− σ)wˆ∗)
which after simplification and using equations (30) and (37) yields
ϑ
PˆD
dt
= − (δh − sh)
(1− δh)(σ − 1)
{
[(σ − 1)(s∗h − sh) + (σ − 2)(µ1 + µ2)]nf
τpfDf
ρ
+ (µ2σ + sf (σ − 1))
}
+ (1− sh)
{
−A(µ2σ + sf (σ − 1)) + (s
∗
h − sh
1− δh )
nfτpfDf
ρ
}
(39)
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Thus the aggregate price index can either increase or fall depending on
specific parameter values.Moreover the total output produced by the im-
port competing sector (nhxh) may also go either way. (See Appendix-C for
derivation)
4. Conclusion
Metzler (1949) had shown that imposition of a tariff can paradoxically
fail to protect the import competing sector. This can happen when the offer
curve of the country may be so inelastic that the tariff lowers the interna-
tional price of the importables by a very large extent, thereby offsetting the
increase in price caused due to the imposition of the tariff itself. Thus tar-
iffs fail to protect the import competing sector in this situation. However,
neo-classical trade theory considers this Metzler Paradox as a case of mere
theoretical interest (See Marjit (1993) and Caves and Jones(1985)). Help-
man and Krugman (1979) shows, price reducing effect of tariffs becomes
more relevant, in a setting characterized by monopolistic competition and
increasing returns to scale. In such a situation imposition of tariff is clearly
desirable from the point of view of the policy maker. This is because the
aggregate price index of the differentiated goods sector falls and the num-
ber of varieties produced in the home market also rises (which are relatively
cheaper than their foreign counterpart, due to the presence of transportation
costs). Imposition of tariff by the home economy causes a global shift in the
distribution of production of the differentiated varieties across the world.
This benefits the consumers of the home economy as they have to bear an
additional transportation cost for a lesser number of varieties. The present
model makes two important departure from the Helpman and Krugman
(1979) model. In the first departure, a mobile capital is introduced into the
model. Imposition of tariff,in presence of transportation costs, gives incen-
tives to firms to locate thier production in the home economy rather than in
the foreign. This benefits consumers by lowering the price index, just as in
Helpman and Krugman(1979). Moreover, this has interesting implications
for capital inflow into the tariff protected import competing sector. Johnson
(1967) and Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro(1977) argues that capital inflow in
presence of distortionary tariffs can be welfare immiserising. This may not
be the case when Home market effects are present in the model.
The model is further extended to show that the situation may become more
nuanced when we relax the assumptions of single factor of production and
introduce a homogeneous non traded good. Imposition of the tariff has an
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ambiguous effect on the aggregate price index. Also important from the pol-
icy perspective, is the fact that number of varieties produced by the home
may actually fall. Policy makers, if they are interested in protecting the
import competing sector may not thus be able to achieve it , when home
market effects are present. This is in contrast to Venables (1987) and Help-
man and Krugman (1989). Though our model shows that tariff may increase
the aggregate price index of the differentiated goods industry, it also opens
upon the channel that the industry may actually contract in terms of va-
rieties and total output produced by the tariff protected import competing
sector.(one can consider this as an example of Metzler Paradox in terms of
quantities) This is quite paradoxical, since tariff protection is often sought
to expand the import competing sector. Clearly, the effect on welfare is
ambiguous and will depend on particular parameterization.
Appendix A.
From equation (11) equations (8) and (9) can be expressed as
P 1−σD = nh + nf (τ(1 + t))
1−σ
P ∗
1−σ
D = nh(τ)
1−σ + nf
Substituting these into equation (13) and also using the fact that nh =
KH +KF − nf , equation(15) in the main text is obtained.
Now consider equation (16),
dnh
dt
=
KH +KF
[τ1−σB − (B + 1) + {τ(1 + t)}1−σ]2
[{
τ1−σB − (B + 1)
+{τ(1 + t)}1−σ
}{
τ1−σ(1 + t)−σ(1− σ)− στ
1−σ(1 + t)−σ
1− τ1−σ
}
−{{τ(1 + t)}1−σ −B}
{
τ2−2σσ(1 + t)−1−σ
1− τ1−σ −
τ1−σσ(1 + t)−1−σ
1− τ1−σ
+τ1−σ(1− σ)(1 + t)−σ
}]
(A.1)
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Now at the vicinity of free trade, we put t = 0, thus
dnh
dt
=
KH +KF
(2τ1−σ − 2)2
[{
τ1−σ(1− σ)− στ
1−σ
1− τ1−σ
}
(2τ1−σ − 2)
−(τ1−σ − 1)
{
τ2(1−σ)σ
1− τ1−σ −
στ1−σ
1− τ1−σ + τ
1−σ(1− σ)
}]
=
KH +KF
4(τ1−σ − 1)2
[
2(τ1−σ − 1)
{
τ1−σ(1− σ)− στ
1−σ
1− τ1−σ
}
−(τ1−σ − 1)
{
τ2(1−σ)σ
1− τ1−σ −
στ1−σ
1− τ1−σ + τ
1−σ(1− σ)
}]
=
KH +KF
4(1− τ1−σ)
[
τ1−σ(σ − 1) + στ
1−σ(1 + τ1−σ)
1− τ1−σ
]
(A.2)
This is equation (16) in the main text.
Near the free trade equilibrium, nh = (K
H + KF )/2 and also nf =
(KH + KF )/2. Substituting this in equation (16) will give equation-(17)
Total differentiation of equation-(8) near free trade (t = 0) yields
P̂d(1− σ) = shn̂h + (1− sh)(n̂f + (1− σ)dt) (A.3)
where sh =
nhp
1−σ
h
nhp
1−σ
h +nf (τpf (1+t))
1−σ =
1
1+τ1−σ . After some manipulations this
can be expressed as
(σ − 1)P̂d
dt
= (1− 2sh) n̂h
dt
+ (σ − 1)(1− sh)
=
(
τ1−σ − 1
τ1−σ + 1
)
n̂h
dt
+ (σ − 1) τ
1−σ
1 + τ1−σ
=
−1
2(1 + τ1−σ)
[
τ1−σ(σ − 1) + σ(1 + τ
1−σ)
1− τ1−σ
]
+ (σ − 1) τ
1−σ
1 + τ1−σ
(A.4)
Rearranging the terms we get
(σ − 1)P̂d
dt
=
1
2(1 + τ1−σ)
[
(σ − 1)τ1−σ − (σ − 1)τ2(1−σ) − σ − στ1−σ
1− τ1−σ
]
=
−τ1−σ − σ − (σ − 1)τ2(1−σ)
2(1 + τ1−σ)(1− τ1−σ) (A.5)
which is equation (18) in the text. To understand the effect on welfare , it
is instructive to understand the effect of the tariffs on per-firm output. As
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shown in the main text the per firm domestic output can be expressed as
xh = ρP
σ−1
d + τ
1−σρP ∗
σ−1
d (A.6)
Differentiating both sides we get
dxh = ρP
σ−1
d [(σ − 1)Pˆd] + τ1−σρP ∗
σ−1
d [(σ − 1)Pˆ ∗d ] (A.7)
Differentiating equation(13) from the main text,
(1− σ)Pˆd = (σ − 1)Pˆ ∗d −
στ(1 + t)−(σ+1)dt
1− τ1−σ(1 + t)−σ (A.8)
From equation (9)
(σ − 1)Pˆ ∗d =
1− τ1−σ
1 + τ1−σ
nˆh (A.9)
when all the terms are evaluated around free trade. Substituting A.8 and
A.9 into A.7 we get
dxh = ρP
σ−1
d [(σ − 1)Pˆd + τ1−σ(σ − 1)Pˆ ∗d ]
= ρP σ−1d
[
1− τ1−σ
1− τ1−σ nˆh −
στ1−σ
1− τ1−σ dt+
τ1−σ(1− τ1−σ)
1 + τ1−σ
nˆh
]
= ρP σ−1d
[
1− τ2(1−σ)
1− τ1−σ nˆh −
στ1−σ
1− τ1−σ dt
]
= dt
[
τ1−σ(σ − 1) + στ
1−σ(1 + τ1−σ)
1− τ1−σ −
στ1−σ
1− τ1−σ
]
= dt
[
τ1−σ(σ − 1) + στ
2(1−σ)
1− τ1−σ
]
> 0 (A.10)
this implies that per firm output rises in the home economy, (as also the
interest rate from equation (12)) along with an increase in the total number
of home varieties produced. Thus the volume of the import competing
sector expands. All these factors tend to increase the utility of the domestic
consumers. However the net effect on the welfare of the home residents
remains ambiguous. This is because the total tariff revenue T = tnfpfDf
may either rise or fall.
Appendix B.
For purpose of stability, it is assumed that firms enter into the market
when existing firms earn supernormal profits and in turn diminishes profits
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earned by each firm. On the other losses cause exit of firms from the industry
and this reduces the losses made by existing firms in the industry. .Thus
profits earned by each of the firms are a decreasing function of the total
number of firms operating in the market.
Consider the profit earned by the home firm
pih =
Dh + τD
∗
h
σ
− r
=
αρP σ−1d + τ
1−σαw∗P ∗1−σd − σr
σ
(B.1)
Total differentiation of the above expression yields
1
σ
dpih = ρP σ−1d (σ − 1)P̂d + τ1−σw∗P ∗
1−σ
d (w
∗ + (σ − 1)P ∗)− σrrˆ (B.2)
After a little manipulation this yields
= ρP σ−1d
[
(σ − 1)P̂ ∗d +
(s∗h − sh)
1− δh n̂h + ŵ
∗(σ − 1)(s∗h − sh)
]
+ τ1−σw∗P ∗
σ−1
d P̂
∗
d
+τ1−σw∗P ∗
σ−1
d ŵ
∗ − σ
α
rrˆ
= σr
[
((σ − 1)P̂ ∗d − rˆ) + ρP σ−1d
[
(s∗h − sh)
1− δh n̂h + ŵ
∗(σ − 1)(s∗h − sh)
]]
= σr[µ2 + (σ − 2)](−A)n̂h + τ1−σw∗P ∗σ−1d (−A)n̂h + ρP σ−1d
[
(s∗h − sh)
1− δh n̂h
+(σ − 1)(s∗h − sh)(−A)n̂h
]
(B.3)
Dividing both sides by nˆh we get
1
σdpi
h
n̂h
= σr[µ2 + (σ − 2)](−A) + τ1−σw∗P ∗σ−1d (−A) + ρP σ−1d
[
(s∗h − sh)
1− δh
+(σ − 1)(s∗h − sh)(−A)
]
(B.4)
Now our assumption implies that LHS must be negative, which in turn
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means
[ρP σ−1d + τ
1−σw∗P ∗
σ−1
d ]
[
[(σ − 1)µ2 + (σ − 2)](−A) + τ1−σw∗P ∗σ−1d + ρP σ−1d
[
(s∗h − sh)
1− δh
+(σ − 1)(s∗h − sh)(−A)
]]
< 0
or, ρP σ−1d
[
A
{
(σ − 1)µ2 + (σ − 1)(s∗h − sh) + (σ − 2)
}
− s
∗
h − sh
1− δh
]
+τ1−σw∗P ∗
σ−1
d A((σ − 1)(µ2 + 1)) > 0
or,
[
A
{
(σ − 1)µ2 + (σ − 1)(s∗h − sh) + (σ − 2)
}
− s
∗
h − sh
1− δh
]
+
τ1−σw∗P ∗σ−1d A((σ − 1)(µ2 + 1))
ρP σ−1d
> 0
Now consider the last term in the left hand side of the inequality,
τ1−σw∗P ∗σ−1d A(σ − 1)(µ2 + 1)
ρP σ−1d
=
τ1−σw∗P ∗σ−1d A(σ − 1)
ρP σ−1d
[
τ1−σw∗1−σρσ
ρ− τ1−σw∗1−σρσ + 1
]
=
A(σ − 1)τ1−σw∗
w∗2−σρσ−1 − τ1−σw∗
= A(σ − 1)µ1 (B.5)
So,
A[(σ − 1)(µ1 + µ2) + (σ − 1)(s∗h − sh) + (σ − 2)]−
s∗h − sh
1− δh > 0
i.e. ϑ > 0 (B.6)
Appendix C.
xˆh = rˆ From equation (24)
Now using equation(26)
rˆ =
−T
αρ− T Tˆ +
nˆh
nhρσ +KH
= −B1{tˆ− sh
1− δh nˆh − (σ − 1)shwˆ
∗ +
dt
1 + t
[sf (σ − 1)− σ]}
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So,
xˆh = rˆ = −B1tˆ+ {B1 sh
1− δh −
1
nhρσ +KH
}nˆh +B1(σ − 1)shwˆ∗ + B1dt
1 + t
[sf (1− σ) + σ]
Total output produced by the import competing sector in Home is given
by nhxh
n̂hxh = [1 +
B1sh
1− δh −
1
nhρσ +KH
]nˆh +
B1dt
1 + t
[sf (1− σ) + σ]−B1tˆ+B1(σ − 1)wˆ∗
= [1 +
B1sh
1− δh −
1
nhρσ +KH
]
dt
ϑ
{
− [(σ − 1)(s∗h − sh) + (σ − 2)(µ1 + µ2)]nf
τpfDf
αρ
+ (µ2σ + sf (σ − 1))
}
+
B1dt
1 + t
[sf (1− σ) + σ]−B1tˆ+ B1(σ − 1)dt
ϑ{
−A(µ2σ + sf (σ − 1)) + (s
∗
h − sh
1− δh )
nfτpfDf
αρ
}
which is indeterminate in its sign.
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